Abstract. Thi~ paper is devoted to the study of non convex models of welfare economics with public gooclH and infinite-dimensional commodity spaces. Our main attention i~ paid to new extensions of the fundamental second welfare theorem to the models under consideration. Based on advanced tools of variational analysis and generalized differentiation, we establish appropriate approximate and exact versions of the extended second welfare theorem for Pareto, weak Pareto, and strong Pareto optimal allocations in both marginal price and decentralized price forms.
Introduction
In this paper we consider general nonc:onvex models of welfare economics involving both private and public goods in infinite-dimensional spaces of commodities. Models of this type have been well recognized from both theoretical and practical viewpoints. Despite a. number of excellent works in this area, there are great many of important unsolved problems some of whieh are addressed in our study.
Reeall that in general equilibrium theory a. commodity is defined not only by its physical properties but also by the date, the location, and the state of its nature that precise the condition of its availability. The classical general equilibrium theory deals with a finite number of commodities, which implies that the economic activity extends over only finitely many dates, location, and events. Such an assumption, contrary to the framework of many applied models particularly involving location, growth, and finance, dramatically limits the scope of applications of the results obtained to understand the real economic life.
Moreover, the physical property of a commodity can vary continuously depending on some characteristics. In such dynamic settings, a. commodity is defined as a point in a space of characteristics describing, e.g., its location, design, quality, functioning, etc. To give a solid foundation to analysis of allocation over time or state of nature was the primary motivation for the study of infinite-dimensional economies; see, e.g., the paper by Debreu and Hildenbrand [11] , which was one of the first to seriously address this and related issues.
Our paper concerns the study of infinite-dimensionalnonconvex economic models from the viewpoint of Pareto optimality/ efficiency. It has been fully recognized that the concept of Pareto optimality and its variants play a. crucial role in equilibrium models to make the best decisions for competitive economies; see, e.g., [2, 3, 9, 10, 17, 20, 31] with detailed discussions and the references therein.
The classical (foundation) approach to the study of Pareto optirnality in models of welfare economics with only private goods and smooth data in finite-dimensional spaces of commodities consists of reducing them to conventional problem of mathematical programming and and the subsequent usage of first-order necessary optimality conditions involving Lagrange multipliers; see Hick [15] , Lange [22] , and Samuelson [33, 34] . It was shown in this way that the marginal rates of substitution in consumption and production sectors are identical at any Pareto optimal allocation of resources.
The underlying hypothesis in the foundation works on welfare economics [15, 22, 33, 34] was the smoothness/differentiability of the production and utility functions involved in the models. In the beginning of 1950s, Arrow [3] and Debreu [10] made the next crucial step in general equilibrium theory considering models of welfare economics with possibly nonsmooth but convex data in finite-dimensional commodity spaces. Based on the classical separation theorem for convex sets, they established a key result called the second fundamental theorem of we~f'a:re economics. This theorem, which is a convex counterpart of the aforementioned result on the marginal rates of substitution, states that any Pareto optimal allocation can be decentmlized as price equilibrium, i.e., it can be sustained by a nonzero price at which each consumer minimizes his/her expenditure and each firm maximizes its profit.
The Arrow-Debreu decentralization approach to Pareto optimality has played a profound role in general equilibrium theory and particularly in welfare economics. On the other hand, the relevance of convexity hypotheses is often doubtful in mai1y applications, e.g., for practically realistic models involving the increasing return to scale in the production sector. In fact, it was observed by Samuelson [34, pp. 231-232] , even before the appearance the Arrow-Debreu model, that the convexity assumptions are fulfilled "only be accident."
In his pioneering study on price decentralization of Pareto optimal allocations in nonconvex economies with private goods, Guesnerie [14] imposed convexity assumptions not on the initial production and preference sets, but on their tangential approximations via the Dubovitskii-Milyutin cone of interior displacements. Starting with [14] , the results of the second welfare theorem type for nonconvex models are interpreted as marginal price eqnilibTi,a, where marginal prices at Pareto optimal allocations are formalized via the corresponding normal cone that is dual/polar to the tangent cone in question. Guesnerie's approach to nonconvex welfare economics and its elaborations are strongly based on the convexity assumption imposed on the approximating tangent cone.
Further progress in this direction has been achieved by using Clarke's tangent cone in the Guesnerie scheme for various welfare models; see e.g., [6, 9, 21] and their references. An advantage of Clarke's tangent cone is that it is automatically convex, but a strong disadvantage comes from the fact that the corresponding normal cone happens to be too large (often the whole space) and thus does not allow us to bring useful infonnation for marginal price equilibria. These issues have been recognized and discussed by Khan [20] .
Khan's new approach to marginal price equilibria goes back, in a sense, to the foundation works in welfare economics [15, 22, 34] , which do not use convex separation techniques but reduce the welfare model to an optimization problem that contains at that time nondif-ferentiable data. He employs, in the case of finite commodities, the metric approximation method developed by Mordukhovich in nondifferentiable programming [26, 27] and arrived in this way, under appropriate constraint qualifications, at the marginal price equilibrium formalized via the Mordukhovich normal cone, which is much smaller than the Clarke one. Further results in this directions for various models of welfare economics can be found in more recent publications [4, 7, 12, 16, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, 31, 37] and their references.
Concerning economies with public goods, the first fundamental result in the "foundation" direction was obtained by Samuelson [35] who showed that at Pareto optimal allocation the marginal rates of transformation of public goods are equal to the sum of the individual marginal rates of substitution. After more than decade from Samuelson's result, Foley [13] and Milleron [25] established appropriate versions of Arrow-Debreu second wel-. fare theorem for economies with public goods under convexity assumptions. I\1ore recent results for nonconvex models of welfare economics involving public goods were obtained in [19, 20, 21, 36, 37] ; see also the references therein.
The main setting of this paper is a general model of nonconvex welfare economics with public goods formulated in the framework of Asplund commodity spaces; see Section 2 for mode details. We develop an approach to the study of this model based on advanced tools of variational analysis and generalized differentiation revolving around the extremal pTinciple; see [30, Chapter 2] . The latter fundamental principle (in its both approximate and exact forms) provides, on one hand, necessary conditions for a certain extremal relationship between closed sets while, on the other hand, can be treated as a variational nonconvex counterpart of the classical separation principle in convex analysis. This approach was suggested in [28] for welfare models with only private goods and then developed in [4, 5, 23, 29, 31] and other publications. We also refer the reader to [7, 12, 16, 17, 18] and the bibliographies therein for similar nonconvex separation ideas closely related to the extremal principle. To some extent, this variational approach via the extremal principle can be viewed as a common roof for the foundation ideas of using first-order optimality conditions as well as for the Arrow-Debreu developments based on convex separation. To the best of our knowledge, such an approach has never been implemented in models of welfare economics with public goods, even in the case of finite commodities.
Developing the variational lines of research, we derive in this paper several new versions of the extended second welfare theorem for nonconvex economies. Vle start with an approximate/fuzzy version of the second welfare theorem for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations, where marginal prices are formalized via Frechetjregular normals. Results of this type hold under rather unrestrictive assumptions, but they apply merely to some suboptimal feasible allocations nearby the optimal ones. Imposing additional "normal compactness" requirements on the sets involved in the model, we arrive at an exact/pointwise version of the extended second-welfare theorem with marginal prices formalized via the Mordukhovich normal cone. Furthermore, the usage of the advanced tools of generalized differential and of the associated variational techniques allows us to establish certain decentralized versions of the marginal price results by employing some nonlinear prices. Considering finally, strong Pareto optimal allocations, the notion introduced by Khan [19] and largely underinvestigated in the literature, we obtain the corresponding versions of the extended second welfare theorem for nonconvex economies with public goods in the absence of the conventional qualification conditions needed for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe and discuss a nonconvex model of welfare economics with both private and public goods in infinitedimensional commodity spaces. We also formulate general qualification conditions employed in the paper for studying Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations and present some sufficient conditions for their fulfillment.
Section 3 contains required preliminaries from variational analysis and generalized differentiation needed for deriving the main results of the paper on the extended versions of the second welfare theorem, which are given in the subsequent sections.
In Section 4 we first establish an approximate version of the second welfare theorem with rna.r:qina.l price.s formalized via the Frechet normal cone at Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations under the corresponding net demand qualification conditions for nonconvex economies involving public goods. After discussing some remarkable consequences of this result, we derive its decentralized (Arrow-Debreu type) version by using 11onlinear prices. This is based on a smooth variational description of of Frechet normals.
Section 5 is devoted to exact versions of the second welfare theorem for weak Pareto and Pa.Teto optimal allocations under the so-called .sequential normal compactness (SNC) conditions imposed on (some of) the sets in question. Conditions of this type are automatic in finite dimensions and always hold for sets with certain Lipschitzian properties in infinitedimensional spaces and can be viewed as far-going extensions of the classical nonempty interior property of convex sets; we do not require the latter even in convex settings.
The final Section 6 concerns welfare economies with ordered commodity spaces. First we establish the price po.sitivity for such models under natural assumptions of the de.sirabilityjfree di.spo.sal type and then derive new results on the fulfillment of an extended version of the second welfare theorem specific for .strong Pareto optimal allocations of convex and nonconvex economies with private and public goods.
Our notation is basically standard in variational analysis and economic modeling; cf. [20, 30, 31, 37] . Unless otherwise stated, the generic space X under consideration is Banach with the norm II ·II and the canonical pairing (·, ·) between X and its topological dual X* endowed with the weak* topology w*. Recall that IB and JB* stand for the closed unit ball in X and X*, respectively; IN:= {1,2, ... } is the collection of natural numbers. Given a set-valued mapping F: X =t X*, denote by
the .sequential Painleve-Kuratow.ski ov.terjupper limit of F as x -; x. Some more specific symbols are defined in the text below.
Nonconvex Economies with Private and Public Goods
Let us first formulate a general and well-recognized by now model of ~elfare economics with private and public goods; see, e.g., [20, 35] . This model denoted byE involves two categories of commodities: private and public. Consumption of the first type is exclusive, i.e., what is taken by one individual automatically becomes unavailable for all the others. In contrast, a good is public if its consumption is identical across all the individuals. Ivlathematically this means that the commodity space E is represented as the product of two spaces E = E1r x E 9 , where E1r stands for the commodity space pertaining to private goods while E 9 is the commodity space of public goods.
The consumption set for the ith consumer is given by a subset Ci of E that describes those consumption bundles that can be realized. A consumption plan for the ith consumer is a bundle :z: E C;. A consumption plan specifies some amount of goods and labor, which the ith consumer is able to realize; thus the ith consumption set Ci c E is the collection of all these consumption plans.
Production refers to a process by which certain commodities (inputs) are transformed into different ones (outputs). A production plan for the l" firm, denoted by y1 E E, specifies the amount of inputs that are required to obtain some outputs. A production set for the l" firm, denoted by SJ C E, is the collection of all the production plans that are possible for the l" firm according to the technological knowledge available to it.
The Model
The [9, 20] .
In general the net demand set vV describes natural situations tha.t may happen when the initial aggregate endowment is not exactly known due to, e.g., incomplete information. The latter particularly reflects uncertainties in economic modeling.
Next. we define the notions of feasible allocations for the economy E under consideration.
Definition 2.1 (feasible allocations). We say that (x, y)
i.s satisfied with the given net demand constraint set liV.
The main goal of this paper is to study the following Pareto-type notions of optimal allocations for E from the viewpoint of deriving necessary optimality conditions for them, which provide in fact. extended Versions of the second welfare theorem for economies with (private and) public goods.
Definition 2.2 (Pareto-type optimal allocations). Let (x,y) be a feasible allocation of the economy E with the local satiation property
xi E cl Pi(x) for all i = 1, ... , n.
(2.2)
Then we say that: 
(2.5)
It is clear that (iii)==>(ii)==>(i) but not vice versa. Note the notions of Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations are conventional in welfare economics. The notion of strong Pareto orrtimal allocations was introduced by Khan [19] and then was studied, e.g., in [4, 5, 20, 23, 29, 31] , particularly for economies with only private goods.
We can naturally define appropriate local versions of the above Pareto-type optima.! allocations, but in this paper we confine ourselves with the study of the (global) versions from Definition 2.2. In the recent paper [4] the reader can find more discussions on the relationships between local and global Pareto-type notions and the corresponding versions of the extended second welfare theorem for economies with only private goods.
Qualification Conditions
We formulate and discuss here the mild qualification conditions introduced in [28) and then used in [23, 29, 31] for studying Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations of welfare economies with only private goods. 
and say that:
ther-e o:re a nv.mber s > 0 and a sequence { ek} C E with ek ~ 0 as k ~ 0 such that 
Since we obviotisly have the inclusion n n i=l i#io the ND\VQ condition implies the NDQ one while, as it is easy to see, not vice versa.. Note that for economies with only private goods and markets clear constraints-i.e., when W = (w, 0) E E1r x E 9 in (2.1)-the NDQ condition was defined and applied in [17, 18] with discussing sufficient conditions for its validity that cover those from [6, 9] and other publications. Some extension of the NDQ condition has been recently introduced in [16] for private good economies; see also [4, 5] for further extensions and more discussions. In [13, 21, 19, 20, 25, 35, 36] the reader can find qualification conditions for economies with public goods implying the NDQ condition from Definition 2.3.
Observe that the NDQ condition is designed to handle Pareto optimal allocations of welfare economies while the ND\iVQ one is more appropriate for the study of weak Pareto optimality; see below. We refer the reader to [4, 5, 12] for some specifications of the NDWQ condition for weak Pareto optimal allocations and their relationships with l\llas-Collel's uniform properness [24] and its modifications for economies with private goods.
To present next verifiable conditions ensuring the NDQ and NDWQ ones, we recall an important property of sets broadly used in the paper. A nonempty subset n c X of a normed space is epi-Lipschitzian around x E cl n (in the sense of Rockafellar [32] ) if there are neighborhoods U of x and 0 of 0 E X, a number 'Y > 0, and a vector c E X such that 0 n U +tO CD+ tc for all t E (0, "(). Note that condition (2.11) is a direct generalization of the desirability direction condition in [24] , which is related to the classical "more is better" assumption for convex economies with only private goods and commodity spaces ordered by their closed positive cones having nonempty interiors. Furthermore, it is important to observe that we do not need to impose any assumption on the preference and/or production sets for the validity of both qualification conditions in Definition 2.3 if the net demand constraint set H! is epi-Lipschitzian around w; this easily follows from Proposition 2.4(ii). The latter covers, in particular, the case of free-disposal Pareto optimum; see, e.g., [9, 20] .
Tools of Variational Analysis
This section contains some constructions and preliminary results from variational analysis and generalized differentiation that are widely used in this paper to derive extended versions of the second welfare theorem in nonconvex economies with public goods. We mostly follow the book [30] , where the reader can find all the proofs and more discussions.
Generalized Normals
\i\Te start with constructions of generalized normals to subsets of Banach spaces. Definition 3.1 (generalized normals to sets). Let D be a nonempty subset of E. The class of Asplund spaces is sufficiently large including, in particular, every reflexive Banach space and every space with a separable dual; see [30] for more details and references.
If E = JRn and n is locally closed around x, representation (3.3) is equivalent to the original definition in [26] 
which implies the representations
Note that in the general nonconvex case the first equality of (3.5) is replaced by
In what follows we also employ the following useful formulas for representing generalized normals to products of arbitrary sets. Recall that a Banach space E is Frechet smooth if there is an equivalent norm on E that is Frechet differentiable at any nonzero point. In particular, every reflexive space is Frechet smooth. Observe also that every Frechet smooth space is Asplund, and hence we can use formula (3.3) for representing our basic normals. (ii) One of the major features of the 1\11-normal cone (3.2) is its nonconvexity, even in the case of rather simple nonconvex sets in finite dimensions, e.g., when Dis either the graph of the function l:rl at (0, 0) E JR 2 or the epigraph of the function -lxl at the origin. This does not allows us to employ conventional techniques of convex and 'convexified' analysis, mainly based on convex separation theorems and related results, to the study and applications of the .M-normal cone and the associated constructions for functions and (single-valued and set-valued) mappings. Also the nonconvexity of (3.2) indicates that this normal cone is not dual/polar to any tangent cone, since polarity always implies convexity. Nevertheless, the .M-nonnal cone and the corresponding subdifferential and coderivative constructions enjoy full calc1tlu.s and other nice properties crucial in applications, mainly in the general framework of Asplund spaces; see [30, 31] and the references therein. These phenomena are based on advanced variational/extremal principles of modern variational analysis.
In the next subsection we present the basic extremal principle in Asplund space used in this paper for deriving extended versions of the second welfare theorem for nonconvex economies with infinite commodities and public goods.
Extremal Principle
First we present and briefly discuss the required definitions and then formulate the underlying results on the extremal principle. The reader can find full proofs, more discussions, and references in [30, Chapter 2] and the commentaries therein. As shown in [30, 31] and their references, the concept of set extremality encompasses various notions of optimal solutions to problems of scalar and vector /multiobjective optimization. On the other hand, a number of nonva.riational issues (e.g., calculus rules, stability, etc.) reduce to extremal systems of sets by using a. variational approach. In this paper we show that the above notions of Pareto optimal allocations in economies with public goods can be reduced to extremal points of appropriate set systems under the im.posed net demand qualification conditions for the cases Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations and with no such conditions for strong Pareto ones.
The next theorem contains two versions of the extremal principle used in what follows. The first version is approximate, which does not require any extra assumptions but expresses the result. in terms of Frechet normals to the sets·n; at points nearby the local extremal one.
The second version provides an exact extremality condition formulated via the 1\!I-normal cone at the local extremal point in question under certain additional assumptions on the sets !1;. These assumptions are automatic in finite dimensions while imposing a sufficient amount of "normal compactness" in infinite-dimensional spaces. In the sequel we use the following condition, perhaps the weakest one of this type needed for general systems of sets. Definition 3.6 (sequential normal compactness). Let .n c E1 x Ez be a set in the pmdv.ct of two normed spaces . We say that: 2 ) 
from (i) we have the implication
If n is a locally closed subset of an Asplund space, we can equivalently put Ek = 0 in all the relationships of Definition 3.6. Observe that, besides sets in finite-dimensional spaces, the SNC property holds for any subset of a Banach space that is compactly epiLipschitzian (CEL) around x En in the sense of of Borwein and Str6jwas [8] , which means that a singleton { c} in definition (2.10) of the epi-Lipschitzian property is replaced by some compact set C C E. More subtle conditions of the Lipschitzian type ensuring tl1e PSNC and strong PSNC properties can be found in [30] Now we are ready to formulate both approximate and exact versions of the extremal principle proved in [30 It. is easy to see from Proposition 3.2 that for the case of two convex sets 0 1 and !1 2 relationships (3.8)-(3.10) of the exact extremal principle reduce to conventional convex separation theorem, where the SNC requirement imposed on one of the sets is a far-going extension of the classical interiority condition, even in the case of convexity. Relationships (3.7)-(3.9) of the approximate extremal principle can be treated as a nonconvex counterpart of the celebrated Bishop-Phelps density theorem for convex sets with empty interiors; see [30, Section 2.1] for more discussions.
Combining these observations with the fact that the extremal principle gives necessary conditions for set extremality and thus can be considered an "extended Lagrange nmltipliers rule," our extremal principle approach to the second welfare theorem provides a unification of the classical foundation approach and the Arrow-Debreu separation/decomposition approach to welfare economics in general nonconvex and nonsmooth settings.
Approximate Versions of the Extended Second Welfare Theorem for Economies with Public Goods
In this section we derive necessary optimality conditions for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations of welfare economies with public goods given in certain approximate forms under the underlying NDQ and NDWQ qualification conditions. The essence of such results, which provide extended versions of the second welfare theorem for convex and nonconvex economies, is that their formulations involve not only the optimal allocation in question, but also feasible allocations nearby. The results obtained in approximate forms hold with no extra assumptions on the initial data in infinite-dimensional commodity spaces. We present two versions of the approximate second welfare theorem for econoTnies with public goods mentioned in Section 1. Let us start with the first version, where (linear) nw.1yinal prices are formalized via Frechet normals. The results are given and proved in a parallel wa.y for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations. Proof. Define the product space X := En+m+l equipped with the sum norm
In this case the corresponding dual norm on X* is given by
Observe that the space X is Asplund as a product of Asplund spaces. To prove both results formulated in the theorem (for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations), we use the approximate extremal principle in the Asplund space X applied to the system of the two closed sets defined as follows: which contradicts the weak Pareto optimality of the allocation (x, y). The comparison of (4.11) with (2.9) gives us the inclusion .17) it is not hard to observe from ( 4.15) and the structure of the set D2 in ( It follows from the first relationship in (4.14), representation (4.16), and the form of the dual norm ( 4.6) that the nontriviality estimates in ( 4.5) hold. From the second relationship in (4.14) we further get that -v* C u* + (s/2)JB* C N(u; Dl) +siB*, which implies by (4.16) that Employing the first product formula in Proposition 3.3 to the set n1 in (4.7) and observing that all the above triples (.rei, yi, w) belong to the corresponding €-neighborhoods of the optimal one (x,'f},w), we conclude from the latter inclusion that all the relationships in ( 4.2)-( 4.4) are satisfied, which completes the proof of the theorem. 6
Observe that the equality relationship (4.1) between the marginal prices in the public goods sector confirms and extends the fundamental conclusion of welfare economics with public goods that goes back to Samuelson [35] : the marginal rates of transformation for public goods eqv.al to the sum of the individual marginal rates of substitution at Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations.
Let us present a specification of Theorem 4.1 in the conventional case with no initial endowment of public goods, i.e., when w = vV7l" X {0}. The next consequence of Theorem 4.1 gives a specification of the results in the case of conve:d.ty assumptions imposed on preference and production sets. In this case the marginal price relationships reduce, respectively, to global minimization (maximization) of the perturbed consumer expenditures (firm profits) over the corresponding preference (production) sets. This provides an approximate decentralized price equilibrium in convex models with no standard interiority assumptions. The next theorem, developing the corresponding results of [29, 31] to economies with public goods, establishes a decentralized price equilibrium of the convex type as in Corollary 4.3 but for general nonconvex models. The "price to pay" for this is the usage of nonlineaT prices in nonconvex models instead of conventional linear prices as in Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.3. Note that the essence of nonlinear prices used here as well as in [29, 31] is different from that of [2] and related publications dealing with convex economies. Applying now the smooth variational descriptions of Frechet normals in ( 4.21) from assertions (i) and (ii) Theorem 3.4, we complete the proof of this theorem. 6 
Exact Versions of the Extended Second Welfare Theorem for Economies with Public Goods
In this section we establish necessary optimality conditions for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations of the nonconvex economy £ with public goods in the exact/pointwise form of the extended second welfare theorem under additional SNC assumptions in1posed on the sets involved in the description of the economy£. Note that SNC property and its partial modifications seem to be the weakest among compactness-like requirements needed for exact forms of the second welfare theorem. As mentioned in Section 3 and fully discussed in [30, Subsection 1.1.4], the basic SNC property is generally weaker that the CEL assumption imposed in the corresponding extensions [12, 17, 18] for economies with only private goods. In this way we get improvements of the second welfare theorem even in the classical settings of convex economies with both private and public goods. We also present a decentralized version of the exact second welfare theorem for nonconvex economies via nonlinear prices.
Vve begin with the basic version of the second welfare theorem with marginal prices formalized via the 111-norma.l cone (3.2) at Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations. and the underlying equality ( 4.1) for the prices associated with public goods.
Proof. Vve know from the proof of Theorem 4.1 that (x, y, w) is an extremal point of the systems of sets {S11,S12} defined in (4.7) and (4.8) under the NDQ (resp. NDWQ) condition in the case of Pareto (resp. weak Pareto) optimal allocations of the economy £. To get a pointwise version of extended second welfare theorem, we can apply the exact extremal principle from assertion (ii) of Theorem 3.7. In this way we obtain, similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.1, the conclusions of Theorem 5.1 under consideration in the case of finitedimensional commodity spaces. However, in infinite dimensions this approach requires imposing the SNC assumption on all of the sets ( h· he It follows from ( 4.5) that the price sequences {(p~,p~ik)} are bounded for all i = 1, ... , n.
Taking into account that the commodity space E is Asplund and hence any bounded subset of E* is sequentially compact in the weak* topology of E*, we find (p;, p*i) such that along some subsequences, without relabeling. Setting
. g.-~Pg i=l and passing to the weak* limit in the equality i=1, ... ,n, 
(SNC assumptions).
It follows from the proof of Theorem 5.1 and Definition 3.6(ii,iii) that the SNC requirements on the preference sets cl Pi(x) in the theorem can he relaxed to keep the nontriviality condition (5.1) with taking into account the product structure of the commodity space E =En x E 9 . Indeed, it is sufficient to assume that:
• either one of the sets in (5.3) and (5.4) is strongly PSNC with respect of the first component while all the sets in· (5.2) are PSNC with respect to the second cmnponent at the corresponding points;
• or all the sets in (5.2) are strongly PSNC with respect to the second component while one of the sets in (5.3) and (5.4) is PSNC with respect to the first component at the corresponding points.
Observe that in the case of economies with only private goods both requirements above reduce to imposing the SNC property on one of the set in (5.5) at the corresponding point, which is the content of [31, Theorem 8.8 ].
Next we present two useful specifications of Theorem 5.1 for economies with public goods and additional structural requirements on their initial data. The first one concerns economies with a special structure of the net demand constraint set, which includes the case of 1:mplic1:t free disposal of commodities. 
1::.
Vl/e conclude this section with some discussions on possible developments and generalizations of the results obtained for nonconvex economies with public goods. Remark 5.6 (further developments). Similarly to recent developments for economies with only private goods, we have the following modifications and generalizations of the above versions of the extended second welfare theorem for non convex economies with public goods:
(i) Counterparts of the results above hold for strong Pareto optimal allocations and for the new notion of strict Pareto ones [4] under the corresponding modifications of the net demand qualification conditions defined in [4] for economies with only private goods.
(ii) In [16] some refinement of the NDQ condition for Pareto optimal allocation was introduced and employed to the second welfare theorem for economies with only private goods. Analogs of this condition for strong and strict Pareto optimal allocations and the corresponding versions of the second welfare theorem were given in [5] for private goods economies. Following the scheme in [5] , we can extend these conditions and results to nonconvex economies with public goods.
Nonconvex Economies with Ordered Commodity Space
This concluding section of the paper concerns nonconvex economies with public goods and onleTed infinite-dimensional spaces of commodities. First we specify the results obtained above for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations and then establish their new counterparts for the case of strong Pareto optimal allocations. Let E be an ordered Banach space with the closed positive cone
where the standard partial ordering relation is denoted by "~' in accordance to the conventional notation in the economic literature. The associated dual closed positive cone E+, which is the closed positive cone of the ordered space E*, admits the representation E~ := {e* E E*j e* ~ 0} = {e* E E*j (e*,e) ~ 0 for all e E E+}, where the order onE* is induced by the given one "~" on E.
The next theorem provides efficient conditions ensuring the positivity of the marginal prices associated with both private and public goods in our extended second welfare theorem. The result is given for weak Pareto optimal allocations, and hence it holds for any stronger notions of Pareto optimality in the welfare economic model under consideration. • There is j E { 1, ... , rn} such that the lh firm satisfies the free disposal condition Then it follows from (5.3), (5.4), and (6.2)-(6.4) that we have (p;,p;) ;::: 0 provided that either condition (6.3) holds for some j E {1, ... , nt }, or condition (6.4) is satisfied. In particular (unifying the conclusions of Theorem 6.1 and this remark), for the case of economies with only private goods we have that p; ;::: 0 if either one of the consumers i E { 1, ... , n} satisfies the desirability condition (6.1 ), or one of the firms j E {1, ... , rn} satisfies the free disposal condition (6.3), or the implicit free disposal condition (6.4) holds.
Next we derive refined versions of the extended second welfare theorem for strong Pareto optimal allocations of economies with public goods. In contrast to the corresponding results of Theorem 5.1 for Pareto and weak Pareto optimal allocations, the NDQ and NDWQ conditions may not be satisfied. Recall that the closed positive cone B+ C E is generating for E if E = E+-E+. The class of normed spaces ordered by their generating positive cones is sufficiently large including, in particular, all Banach lattice (or complete Riesz spaces); see, e.g., [12, 24] and the references therein. • the .fr·ee disposal of commodities Si -E+ c Si for some j E {1, ... ,m};
• the implicit free disposal of commodities ( 6.4);
• n > 
